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Abstract. A heterogeneous location network is one that derives location
information from multiple sources and provides various location based ser-
vices to users irrespective of the device used. User privacy is an important
issue that needs to be addressed for the growth of heterogeneous location
networks. We propose a secure framework for assuring user privacy in het-
erogeneous location networks. We also present lightweight cryptographic
protocols along with an analysis of the computation requirements and se-
curity capabilities of the proposed framework.
1 Introduction
Location information can currently be derived using Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM), Global Positioning System (GPS), Wireless LAN and
other proprietary technologies like Active Badges [19] and Radar [3]. The location
information derived from each source is of a different level of granularity and can
vary from pinpointing the exact location of the user to confining the user to a known
perimeter. The location information is used to provide services like guiding systems,
location based advertising, and context based authentication and authorisation.
The services are provided to users via different devices such as PDA, laptops, and
mobile phones.
Currently there is a general move towards heterogeneous data access with the
network operator being able to consolidate the billing, transparency of data ac-
cess and authentication over a technologies such as GSM, 3G and wireless LAN
networks. This move can be beneficial to users, network operators and service
providers. It helps the user manage and configure desired privacy policies easily
and provides the flexibility to choose the granularity of location information being
disclosed to a service provider. The service providers can provide a wide range of
location based services to the users. The network operator benefits from consolida-
tion of billing and managing user accounts across multiple networks.
The main purpose of this paper is to present a secure heterogeneous location pri-
vacy framework that can help users to manage and configure their privacy policies
across multiple vendors. This paper also presents secure lightweight cryptographic
protocols and analyses the security and computational capabilities of the frame-
work. The framework forms an essential component in the design of a complete
heterogeneous architecture.
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2 Background information
Context-aware computing is a mobile computing paradigm where applications use
contextual information, such as user location, to provide services to users. For effec-
tive use of context information, issues such as user privacy, communication medium
security, collection of the location information and creation of a centralised loca-
tion dataset must be addressed [7, 16]. Currently, there are different mechanisms to
determine the location of a user and efforts are underway to merge this information
into a single dataset [6, 15]
In most of the existing technologies (e.g. GSM, wireless LAN) the network op-
erator has the responsibility of safeguarding the user information. When a service
provider requests location information, the network operator provides the informa-
tion by asking if the user wants to provide the information to the service provider.
The user has no control over the granularity of information being passed to the
service provider and how the information is used [10]. Since the location informa-
tion provides a track record of user behavior the current authorisation process are
inadequate to provide the required level of privacy.
Recently various governments, standardisation organisations and researchers
have stated the need for users to have a greater transparency and control over
location information [5]. The Fair Information Practices Act of USA [18] states
the need for transparency in the collection and use of personal information. The
“Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001” emphasises the need for location privacy
[5]. Similar legislations also exist in the European Union and Japan [14].
Standardisation organisations like the World Wide Web Consortium and WAP
forum have emphasised the need to assure location privacy [20]. Preferential Pri-
vacy Practices (P3P) has been standardised to assure privacy on the Internet and
meets the requirements of the fair information policies. Thus the forum has en-
dorsed the need for architectures similar to P3P to assure user location privacy [8].
Due to computational constraints on wireless and mobile devices the existing P3P
architecture cannot be used.
Server centric P3P was proposed by Agrawal as an enhancement to the exist-
ing P3P architecture for mobile environments [2]. However the proposal does not
address the issue of location privacy. The ISTF charter for Geographic Location
privacy [9], has listed some of the requirements for assuring location privacy and
emphasises the need for a heterogeneous approach for location privacy. 3GPP group
[1] and GSM LCS [11] standards also provided requirements for location privacy
in 3G and cellular environments.
3 Requirement analysis
This section presents the requirements that need to be addressed for assuring user
privacy in a heterogeneous location framework. The various participating entities
and the requirements for assuring location privacy are as follows:
– User: The entity that requests a location based service and whose location
information needs to be protected;
– Application Service Provider (ASP): Provides the requested service to user;
– Network operator: Provides the required infrastructure to the user;
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– Location server: Derives the location information from various location sources,
stores the information and provides the user with the location information.
User requirements: The user should have the ability to: (1) choose an ASP; (2)
have the flexibility and ability to choose the granularity of location information;
(3) have control over the location information; (4) update and refine policies easily;
and (5) protect their identities if required.
ASP requirements: The ASP should adhere to the stated privacy policy and
the ASP should restrict any collection, use, disclosure of, retention of, and access
to customer location information to the specific purpose that is the subject of the
express authorization of the customer concerned.
Network Operator requirements: The network operator acts impartially
and should act according to the fair information practices while selecting an ASP,
thus providing fair competition among similar services.
Location server requirements: The location server must reconcile the user
location information derived from various sources like GSM, GPS and should pro-
vide the information according to the requested granularity.
General requirements: Only privacy policies relevant to an application should
be disclosed to the ASP. The communication should be efficient and accommodate
the requirements of thin clients. The privacy policies should be easy to export and
import across networks and the privacy policies.
Security requirements: The security properties required are (1) Mutual end-
point authentication between all the participating entities. (2) Data Integrity to
stop modification by unauthorized entities. Connectionless integrity during storage
of location information and user privacy policy. (3) Data confidentiality to protect
from eavesdropping (during transmission and storage)and replay by an adversary.
Additional requirements: The ASP polices should be application specific
instead of a generalised privacy policy. Non-repudiation with proof of origin is
required to ensure that the ASP abides to the stated policy.
4 The proposed privacy framework
A new framework is illustrated in Figure 1. The framework assuring location privacy
in heterogeneous environments and accommodates small devices with limited com-
putational power. The computations takes place at a proxy location with enough
resources. Because the network operator can perform complex computation and
has access to user personal information, such as addresses and billing information
the network operator is suitable to act as a proxy server. The ASPs register the
preferred privacy policies with the network operator. When the user requests a
service to the network operator, the network operator compares the user policies
to the policies of ASPs. The network operator provides the user with the list of
ASPs that match the users preferred privacy policy along with the minimum and
maximum granularity of location information required for the application. The user
then selects an ASP for providing the service.
The ASP sends a copy of the accepted privacy policy to the user along with a
request for the location information. The user requests the location server for the
location information of the chosen granularity. The user then sends the location
information to the ASP and the ASP provides the requested service to the user.
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Fig. 1. The proposed privacy framework
5 Protocols for the proposed framework
This section focuses on secure protocols for the framework. Public key cryptogra-
phy is often preferred for key establishment process due to the simplicity in key
management. Also the security property of non-repudiation is only possible with
the use of public key cryptography. However the use of public key cryptography in
small devices is currently not feasible due to the computation limitations.
Our protocols are designed with the assumption that there exists considerable
trust between the user and network operator. There is a long term secret key shared
between the user-network operator and the user-location server. The network oper-
ator and the ASP have enough resources to perform public key cryptography. The
core of the proposed protocol is a three party key distribution protocol for com-
munication between the user, network operator and the ASP. The protocol varies
from the 3PKD protocol proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [4] in the use of both
symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography for establishment of a session key.
The proof of security for the core protocol were carried out as part of this work
and was presented at ACISP04 [17]. The notations used are shown in Table 1.
5.1 Configuration and registration of user policy
The user configures the preferred privacy policy and sends the policy to the network
operator. The policies are written to the current W3C standards for P3P using
XML. The network operator stores the user policy in the database. The protocol
for the registration of policy is shown in Figure 2. The configuration of policies can
User(U ) NetworkOperator(U )
PriUser
−−−−−→
Fig. 2. Registration of Privacy Policy by the User
take place in any device the user is currently operating. The device sends the policy
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Entities
U Client requesting the service (User)
A Application service provider
S Network operator who is acting as a proxy for the user
LS Location server
Keys
Ei−j Symmetric encryption with secret key between i and j
Ei Asymmetric encryption with public key of entity i
Elements
Sigi Signature generated by entity i
ri Random number generated by entity i
σ Session key generated for communication between the user and ASP
H Hash function
MACki−j Message Authentication code generated by using symmetric key of i and j
PriASP(i) Privacy policy of the ASP for application i
PriUser Privacy policy of the user
AppName Name of the application along with minimum and maximum granularity
Υi Time stamp generated by i
GranReq Granularity of location information required by user
LocInfo Location information of requested granularity
ReqService Service requested by the user
SID Session identifier
Table 1. Protocol notations
to the network operator who stores the user policy. Alternatively services like ‘Over-
The-Air-Service-Provisioning’ (OTASP) can be used to configure the user policy
on the web and then update these to the user and the network operator[12].
5.2 Registration of the privacy policy by the ASP
The ASP registers the preferred privacy policies with the network operator. Each
application requires varied granularity of information and thus a single privacy
policy will not be sufficient for all services the ASP wishes to provide. Thus the
policies are designed to be application specific. When there is a change in the policy
for a specific application or if the ASP terminates service to a specific application
then the privacy policy can be easily updated. This approach gives more flexibility
in managing the user information. The protocol for the registration of the policy by
the ASP is shown in Figure 3. Non-repudiation between the ASP and the network
NetworkOperator(s) ASP(A)
SigASP (PriASP(AppNamej ))
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 3. Registration of Privacy Policy by the ASP
operator assures that the ASP adheres to the stated privacy policy. If the ASP
deviates from the stated privacy policy, the user can then hold the ASP accountable.
To achieve this property the privacy policy of the ASP is signed by the ASP’s
secret key. The higher computation capability between the ASP and the network
operator allows the use of public key encryption. For every application that the
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ASP provides service, the privacy policy will adhere to the requirement of W3C
standard for P3P. The privacy policy of the application will also include the name
of the application, validity of the policy, minimum and maximum granularity of
location information required for the application and date of creation of privacy
policy. PriASP(AppNamej ) is the privacy policy of the application where j = 1 to
n, represents the number of the applications the ASP intends to provide service.
The network operator stores the policy of the ASP in a database. If the ASP
changes a policy for a specific application then the ASP is required to report the
change. The network operator updates the privacy policy of the ASP for the specific
application after receiving the new policy from the ASP.
5.3 Providing the requested service
A list of service providers suitable for the requested application is provided to the
user by the network operator. The network operator also generates session keys
for communication between the user and the ASP for a secure session. Figure 4
describes the process. The various steps in the protocol are as follows:
1. User requests the network operator for a suitable ASP matching the users
preferred policy for an application.
2. The network operator compares the user policy to the privacy policy of various
registered ASPs for the requested application and computes the list of ASPs
matching the users preferred policy.
3. The network operator generates the session keys for the communication be-
tween the ASP and user. For each ASP that matches the user policy a separate
session key is generated. The session ID SID is the concatenation of the time
stamp ΥS and random number rU . A MAC of the session key, session identifier,
a random number sent. The ASP and the network operator identities are gen-
erated by the network operator. The network operator also signs the session
keys generated for the ASP with the network operator secret key. The signature
is encrypted with the public key of the corresponding ASP. This assures that
an adversary cannot find the identity of the user and the accepted policy by
eavesdropping and looking into the information contained in the signature.
4. The network operator then sends the user the list of ASPs and the privacy
policy of the ASP containing the minimum and maximum granularity required
to provide the requested service. The network operator also sends the session
keys generated for the ASPs. The message is encrypted with a long term secret
key agreed between the user and network operator. This key is different from
the secret key used for generation of MAC and encryption of the session key.
Ai , ..Al is the list of all the ASPs sent by the network operator to the user.
5. The user then chooses a suitable ASP and sends the encrypted package gener-
ated by the network operator as a request to provide the service.
This stage provides the ability for the user to choose the service provider the user
feels is safe and trustworthy. Also the user can decide the granularity of information
that needs to be provided. The generation of session keys by the network operator
for communication between the ASP and user helps in saving a large amount
of computation resources at the user device. Once the ASP gets the encrypted
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NetworkOperator(S ) User(U ) ASP(Aj )
rU ,AppName
←−−−−−−−−−
σ ∈R {0, 1}
k
EU−S{Ai, σ, SID, MACU−S(Ai, SID, σ, rU ),
PriASPi (AppName), EA0i{SigS (U, SID, σ,
ΥS , Ai,PriASPi (AppName))}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
i=(1..l)}
User chooses Aj = Ai
EA{SigS (U,SID, σ, ΥS, Aj ,
PriASPj (AppName))}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Eσ{PriASPj (AppName)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 4. Protocol for selection of ASP by user and establishment of secure communication
between the user and ASP
package, it decrypts, checks the privacy policy. The ASP then sends an acceptance
to the user which contains the privacy policy of user encrypted with the session
key generated by the network operator. The user decrypts the acceptance, verifies
the privacy policy sent by the ASP and sends a request to the location server to
provide the requested location information.
5.4 Request for location from location server
The user and the location server share two long term symmetric keys which are
used for secure communication between them. The user sends a request for location
information and the location server responds by sending the location information
of the requested granularity. A time stamp is used to assure freshness. The location
server also generates a MAC of the random number, the location information and
the granularity requested. The key for the generation of the MAC is different from
the key used for the message encryption between the user and location server. The
user then decrypts the information with the shared secret key. The user checks for
the freshness of the information from the time stamp and generating the MAC.
The protocol is described in Figure 5.
User (U) LocationServer(LS )
EkLS−U{rU ,GranReq , U}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
EkLS−U {GranReq , Locinfo,ΥLS
MACkLS−U (rU ,GranReq , Locinfo)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 5. Request for location by user
5.5 Providing the requested service
The user decrypts the information sent by the location server and, after validating
the location information, sends it to the ASP. The ASP uses the information to
provide the requested service. A fresh key is generated if the user needs to request
another application from the ASP. The protocol is described in Figure 6.
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User (U) ASP(A)
Eσ{Locinfo, A,U, ΥLS}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Eσ{ReqService}
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 6. Providing the requested service
6 Comparing the framework to the requirements
User requirements: In the proposed framework the network operator provides
the user a choice of ASPs matching the user preferences providing the user the abil-
ity to choose a suitable ASP. Legislative requirements require the network operator
to provide equal preferences to all ASPs. The privacy policies contain the minimum
and maximum preferences and these are within the user preferences. Thus the user
can choose the granularity of location information and the service provider. The
privacy policies of the user and the network operator need to be similar to P3P
thus allowing the easy update of policies.
ASP requirements: The property of non-repudiation provides a mechanism
to hold the ASP accountable when the ASP deviates from the stated policy. The
non-repudiation is provided by the signing of the privacy policies by the ASP as
shown in Figure 3. Though existing government legislations require the ASP to
seek explicit authorisation before providing the information to a third part there
is no mechanism to assure this in the proposed framework.
Network operator requirements: In the current architecture the network
operator needs to provide the user with a choice of suitable service providers. The
mechanism provides a means for the user to choose the service provider and the
granularity of information thus giving the flexibility to the user to get a satisfactory
service. The framework provides a means to assure fair competition among service
providers whose privacy preferences match the user preferences.
Location server requirements: The information is derived from multiple
sources and the location data set is created based on the location derived from
various sources. The time stamp enables the user to check the freshness of the
information. The MAC further assures the location information is not replayed from
an adversary. Since the information is sent to the user and the user then forwards
the information to the service provider, the user can verify that the information is
of the requested granularity.
General requirements: The user does not disclose his preferred privacy policy
to the ASP. The ASP can only know that the user’s preferences match the ASP
preferences. Since the privacy policy is application specific, the ASP providing the
service will only be able to know the privacy policy matches the preferences of
application requested by the user.
The processing of the policies takes place at the location of the network operator.
The protocols are lightweight and from Table 2 it can be observed that the user is
not required to perform complex operations. The user is limited to generating two
symmetric encryption/decryption operations and a MAC.
These operations require limited amount of resources and can be performed eas-
ily on a smart card. Symmetric key encryption and decryption using DES algorithm
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Table 2: Number of cryptographic operations required for the proposed protocols
can be performed on a Gemplus GPK8000 smart card at 507 kbps. The amount
of time taken for the generation of the MAC using SHA is just 0.35 ms. This is
quite reasonable compared to the time taken for the generation and verification of
a digital signature which usually takes 94ms signature generation and 125ms for a
signature verification using a DSS algorithm [13]. The policies designed are in XML
and similar to P3P policy to meet the WAP-W3C requirements. Thus they can be
easily imported and exported across networks. These are policy requirements that
are currently not addressed by the framework but part of work in progress.
Security requirements:
1 Mutual end-point authentication: The authentication between the user-
network operator and user-location server is provided by the existing infrastructure.
The communication between the user and the service provider takes place after the
establishment of the session key.
2 Data Integrity: The use of MAC assures that the integrity of communications
taking place between the user-network operator and user-location server. The use
of signature based authentication for transmitting the session key between the user
and ASP along with the time stamp assures the integrity of the session key and in
turn the integrity of information between the user and ASP.
3 Data confidentiality: There are three types of important information that
need to be secure: (1) user location information between location server and user;
(2) session key to be used for communication between the user and ASP generated
by network operator; and (3) communication between user and ASP.
The long term key shared between the user-network operator and user-location
server assure the confidentiality of communication.The time stamp assures the
freshness of the session key.
Additional requirements: The framework specifically states that the privacy
policy of the ASP needs to be application specific and contains the minimum and
maximum granularity required for each application to function. Also the service
provided to user is based on the privacy requirements of the user for a specific
application. From Figure 3 it can be observed that the ASP signs the preferred
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privacy policy and sends this to the network operator. This signed privacy policy
provides the non-repudiation with proof of origin from the ASP.
7 Conclusion
The proposed framework and protocols help to ensure security and privacy of het-
erogeneous location networks. Ongoing work in progress involves the representation
and formulation of privacy policies focusing on the use of XML. Implementation
and performance analysis of the framework will also be conducted.
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